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Economists, Value Judgments, and Climate Change:
A View from Feminist Economics
Julie A. Nelson

Abstract
A number of recent discussions about ethical issues in climate change, as engaged
in by economists, have focused on the value of the parameter representing the rate of time
preference within models of optimal growth. This essay examines many economists’
antipathy to serious discussion of ethical matters, and suggests that the avoidance of
questions of intergenerational equity is related to another set of value judgments
concerning the quality and objectivity of economic practice. Using insights from feminist
philosophy of science and research on high reliability organizations, this essay argues
that a more ethically transparent, real-world-oriented, and flexible economic practice
would lead to more strongly objective, reliable, and useful knowledge.

Introduction
Following on the October 2006 release of the Stern Review on the Economics of
Climate Change (Stern, 2006), and in discussions of the future of the Kyoto Protocol, a
debate has ensued among economists concerning how quickly and drastically societies
should move on reducing carbon emissions. Some who consider themselves to be in the
mainstream of economic climate research, including Richard Nordhaus (2007) and
Richard Tol and Gary Yohe’s (2006), have taken issue with the Stern Review, arguing
that the decisive policy actions it advises are too extreme. While there are many issues
involved, a good deal of the ensuing debate has focused on the issue of the intertemporal
discounting of utility. Should the rate of time preference parameter, usually denoted as δ
(delta) in models of optimal economic growth, be close to zero, or not? Tilting the
number towards zero, as done in the Stern Review, means that costs and benefits
appearing out in the future weigh more heavily in current decision-making. This lends
support for larger and more drastic abatement efforts, all else equal, since people in the
future will be the major beneficiaries of climate change abatement and mitigation
policies. Using a higher rate of time preference, as favored by Nordhaus (2006) and Tol
and Yohe (2006), greatly reduces consideration of the welfare of future generations. 1
1

See Ackerman and Finlayson (2006) for a more detailed discussion of the relation of time preference to
overall discounting, and a detailed critique of discounting as applied to climate change analysis. Small rates
of discounting make a big difference. If future values are discounted at a rate of 3% per year, for example, a
benefit or cost worth $1 million now is worth only $228,000 if experienced 50 years from now; about
$2,700 if experienced 200 years in the future; and $0.38 if experienced 500 years in the future. Even
applying a lower discount rate of 1% per year, the value is less than $7,000 after 500 years, and drops to
pennies after 1400 years.
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Reading this literature with an interest in exploring its ethical dimensions, one can
notice two distinct but interrelated levels of value judgments. The first and most obvious
is the value judgment about the moral weight to be granted to people who are not yet
alive. 2 This is the question represented by δ within the framework of mathematicallyformulated optimal growth models, and while not resolved, the issue is at least out on the
table. The second is the value judgment made among economists of various stripes as to
what counts as quality, rigorous research. This issue is not yet on the table to the same
degree.
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that this second question of
professional values is deeply related to the first question of intergenerational equity: the
dominant ways in which both these questions are treated within the economics profession
can be traced to a hypervaluation of detachment. By over-emphasizing characteristics of
distance, individuality, autonomy, and abstraction within economic thought, mainstream
economic practices have become severely impoverished. Feminist insights into the roles
of connection and detachment in the history and philosophy of science can help in
analysis of this situation, and in shaping economic practices that can better help address
the real ethical and practical questions we urgently need to face.

The State of Ethical Discussions
A striking feature of a number of economists’ responses to the Review and
discussions of Kyoto is that they appear to argue that rigorous economic analysis of
climate change—an issue with vast repercussions concerning distribution over those
currently alive and between current and future generations--can be accomplished without
recourse to ethical value judgments.
William Nordhaus, for example, ridicules the Review as “tak[ing] the lofty
vantage point of the world social planner, perhaps stoking the dying embers of the British
empire” and accuses the authors of the Review of imposing their own personal ethical
viewpoint in their choice of a near-zero δ (Nordhaus, 2007). While he attempts to
discredit the Review by briefly discussing possible alternate ethical perspectives (2007),
Nordhaus presents his own optimal growth exercise as essentially divorced from any such
considerations. The time discount rate and consumption elasticity (another parameter of
the optimal growth model) must, he says, be chosen to match “actual market data” on real
interest rates and savings rates (700). By appealing to a presumably objective, observable
set of numbers for these parameters, he suggests that his research is more “standard,”
“mainstream,” and presumably more scientific and reliable than the analysis in the
2

In a broader sense, the discussion of ethics of climate change includes consideration of nonhuman wellbeing as well. Since the current paper seeks to engage with the mainstream economics literature, and this
literature focuses, at best, on human well-being (and, more commonly, on abstract notions of utility or
GDP whose relation to well-being can be tenuous), nonhuman welfare will not be discussed here.
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Review. He furthermore attempts to distance himself from ethical concerns by presenting
policy analysis performed within the “context of the existing distribution of income and
investments” (692) not only as standard, but as the only scientifically defensible position.
The baseline case, he writes, “does not make a case for the social desirability of the
distribution of incomes...any more than a marine biologist makes a moral judgment on
the equity of the eating habits of marine organisms" (692). Nordhaus advocates modest
reductions in emissions over the near term, with a “ramp” up to stronger policies in the
future (687).
The holes in Nordhaus’ reasoning are of types that have been well-discussed
elsewhere. Even imagining a world of perfect markets, people’s demonstrated
preferences over their own individual consumption time path (as revealed in savings
rates), for example, cannot be assumed to be identical to their judgments about ethically
appropriate time paths of consumption or utility across generations. To assume so is, as
pointed out by Richard Howarth, to make a fundamental error in logic (2003). 3
Meanwhile, the idea that some observable set of consumption preference parameters
regarding risk and time can be found that will be consistent with observed behavior has
been called a “fantasy” by Martin Weitzman (2007) in his response to the Review, in light
of asset-return puzzles. Lastly, performing policy evaluation purely from the baseline of
the existing income distribution is hardly value-free, but rather a vigorous—and highly
questionable--moral endorsement of the status quo, as any serious student of welfare
economics must acknowledge. Imputing more decision-making power to some groups
over others, whether the sorting factor is dollars to spend or proximity to the present, is
an inherently ethically significant move.
But what is significant for the current paper is not so much the details of the
flawed arguments, but the observation that economists often exhibit strong aversive
reactions to any explicit consideration of ethics. Nordaus’s writings are not the only case.
In Richard Tol and Gary Yohe’s (2006) response to the Review, they likewise disagree
with the Review’s assumptions about the rate of time preference, but do not engage in a
discussion of ethics. Instead, they engage only in the rhetoric of “scientific studies” and
“reason” (245), and appeal to peer-review and accumulation of like-minded studies 4 to
justify their go-slow policy prescriptions. Sheila Olmstead and Robert Stavins avoid
discussion of ethics in their discussion of the future of Kyoto, instead simply presenting
their go-slow advice as “scientifically sound, economically rational, and politically
pragmatic” (2007). While Weitzman’s (2007) has interesting insights about the
observability of appropriate interest rates for discounting, he is also contemptuous of
discussions of ethics—to the point of putting “ethical” in scare quotes in many instances.
He claims that arguments for δ≈0 given by the Stern Review (and, earlier, by William
Cline) are “paternalistic” (707) and that they rely
3

Nordhaus briefly seems to acknowledge this fact ("The individual rate of time preference, risk preference,
and utility functions do not, in principle at least, …[have any] necessary connection with how social
decisions weight different generations," p. 691). But his later discussion of his own analysis does not carry
through on this insight.
4
“In the past, benefit-cost analyses have always advocated rather modest emission reductions” (235,
emphasis added).
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mostly on a priori philosopher-king ethical judgments...instead of trying to
back out what possibly more representative members of society than either
Cline or Stern might be revealing from their behavior is their implicit rate
of pure time preference. An enormously important part of the 'discipline'
of economics is supposed to be that economists understand the difference
between their own personal preferences for apples over oranges and the
preferences of others for apples over oranges…[They are] imposing their
own value judgments on the rest of the world."
(712, emphasis in original)
In such a discussion, one sees a strong repugnance towards making value
judgments expressed in unusually colorful and vociferous language for an academic
publication. What is behind such strength of emotion? Why this passion for dispassion?

Feminism, Objectivity, and Economics
Feminist economics coalesced into a field in the early 1990s, starting with
conferences, and proceeding to the formation of the International Association for
Feminist Economics in 1992, publication in 1993 of the volume, Beyond Economic Man:
Feminist Theory and Economics (Ferber and Nelson, 1993), and commencement of the
publication of a journal, Feminist Economics, in 1995. Feminist economics is not, as it is
sometimes wrongly guessed, simply a political program, nor should it be confused with
an idea of a “feminine” economics in which it might be assumed that women, by nature,
do economics differently from men. Rather, perceptive economists in the 1960s and
1970s had raised doubts about the adequacy of mainstream economic analysis, drawing
attention to its neglect and distortion of women’s experiences in labor markets and
families. By the late 1980s many feminists were realizing that traditional formal choicetheoretic modeling and a narrow focus on mathematical and econometric methods were a
Procrustean bed when it came to analyzing phenomena fraught with connection to others,
tradition, and relations of power—whether or not these phenomena had to do with gender
per se. Questions were raised about mainstream economics not because it is too objective,
but because it is not objective enough (Nelson, 1996).
This is not the place to go into a full explanation of the breadth of feminist
economics, 5 but a few points relevant to the current discussion can be pointed out. In its
efforts to be scientific and objective, mainstream economics has tended to model itself on
early notions of science, in particular adopting Cartesian geometry and Newtonian
physics as models of knowledge. Explorations in the history and philosophy of science
demonstrated how in the 17th and 18th centuries these early versions of scientific though
were formulated as a particularly masculine affair (e.g., Harding, 1986; Keller, 1985). In
the early 1660s, for example, Henry Oldenburg, the first secretary of the Royal Society of
5

See Ferber and Nelson (2003) for a recent survey, and Perkins (1997) for an example of a discussion with
an ecological focus.
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London for Improving Natural Knowledge, stated that the intent of the Society was to
"raise a masculine Philosophy . . . whereby the Mind of Man may be ennobled with the
knowledge of Solid Truths" (quoted in Keller 1985, p. 52). One of the primary
manifestations of this drive for masculinity was a drive for distance and detachment.
Reacting to a medieval world view in which humans were perceived to be embedded in a
sacred, living natural world, the rising scientific worldview placed the scientist outside
of, and above, nature. The scientist was imagined as autonomous, rational, interested in
“hard” knowledge, disinterested, and male. What was left out—human interdependence,
embodiment, emotion, “soft” or qualitative aspects of life, uncertainty, value judgments,
and interests were coded as feminine, non-scientific, and weaker or of lesser value.
Objectivity thus came to be associated with detachment—detachment from social
influences, detachment from the object of study, detachment from other researchers, and
detachment from practical concerns.
Mathematical formalization seemed to offer an entryway into a cool world of pure
reason. Mathematical models can be praised for their clarity, logical rigor, precision,
elegance, parsimony, and generality. But the idea that these qualities reflect the height of
scientific knowledge and that they guarantee true objectivity—that is, reliability of
knowledge untainted by subjective bias—is a chimera, as many scientists, philosophers
of science, and others have pointed out. Instead of objectivity, what a strict adherence to
narrow methods leads to is something that Evelyn Fox Keller (1985) has called
“objectivism”—a romantic belief in the possibility of connection-free knowledge from an
outside-of-nature, perspective-free viewpoint. The reality is that scientists—and
economists—are inherently embedded in nature, embedded in society, and hence part of,
and inherently interested in, the very phenomena we study. There is no Cartesian “view
from nowhere.”
This does not, however, mean that attempts at objectivity need to be abandoned in
favor of an “anything goes” view. 6 Instead, it means that objectivity must be arrived at
not through purity of logical method, but by holding up the results of research to evermore-inclusive communities of inquiry. Choice-theoretic models of family behavior and
labor markets, for example, passed as “objective” among the community of economists in
the 1960s, until feminist critics noted that they were constructed in such a way as to hide
or justify domination and discrimination. Analyses of the costs and benefits of climate
change policies that assume the existing global income distribution likewise only appear
“objective” until voices from the global South speak up to challenge the unspoken ethical
judgments that lie beneath them. Objectivity as an activity of the community has been
called “strong objectivity” by feminist philosopher Sandra Harding (1995). Philosopher
and economist Amartya Sen (1992) has used the term “positional objectivity” to describe
“an objective inquiry in which the observational position is specified (rather than being
treated as an unspecified intrusion--a scientific nuisance).” Sen has argued that any
attempt at position-independent objectivity must build on positional views (i.e., be “transpositional”), rather than ignore the position-dependence of views.
6

Many supporters of formalization present “anything goes” as if it is the only alternative. For example, see
Williamson (2007).
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All the accusations made about the Stern Review “imposing” value-judgments are
really, then, quite silly. The authors of the Review, at least, made their ethical
assumptions explicit, discussed their rationale, and put their analysis out for public
discussion. It is economists who seek to disguise their value judgments under a veneer of
Cartesian objectivism who are dangerous.
The above discussion, of course, gives economists the benefit of the doubt: it
assumes that economists aspire to be objective, but are simply going about it in a
mistaken way. There is an alternative explanation. Many of a Marxist or radical ecology
persuasion equate market commerce and industrialization with the rape of the planet and
the poor, and would regard mainstream economists as no more than the obsequious
servants of global elites and global capital. 7 To the extent that economists try to hide
highly ethically-suspect status-quo-biased value judgments under a veneer of “objective”
analysis, economists actively invite such reactions. Larry Summer’s World Bank memo
on the efficiency of exporting pollution to poor countries, because the value of a life there
is presumed to be cheaper, is one famous example. In discussions of climate change,
consider Olmstead and Stavins (2007) explanation of why emissions targets in the near
future should stay close to business-as-usual levels: “Moderate targets in the short term
will avoid rendering large parts of the capital stock prematurely obsolete"(2). The
authors are particularly interested in protecting investments in electric power plants.
While this explicit statement favoring the protection of the interests of capital over the
interests of people hands the radical critics their target on a platter, Olmstead and Stavins
try to justify themselves by implying that their position is “the scientifically correct and
economically rational approach" (3). Or, perhaps, is it possible that their position might
reflect the interests of their funders? 8 Objectivism can serve as a convenient cover for
particularist and retrograde loyalties; economists should try to do better.

What Kind of Economics Do We Need?
We may be concerned about future generations because we reason that such
concern for humanity in general is fair and just. Or we may be concerned because we can
imagine the distress we might be bringing on our own children and grandchildren by
failing to address climate change. 9 If we feel concern for future generations for any
reason, and take what climate science is telling us seriously, we are flat out up against a
problem. The problem is that if we allow our economies to run along a business-as-usual
path, we will bequeath to future generations a world whose life-sustaining capacities will
be severely compromised. A number of economists (see discussions below) who are at
7

See, for example, Shiva (2005), Watson (2005), and Bookchin (2005).
Robert Stavins has served as a consultant for PG&E (Pacific Gas and Electric Company).
9
These two approaches are often referred to in the ethics literature as the “justice” orientation, which is
based on rules and principles and related to generalized “others,” versus the “care” orientation, which is
based on attention to relationships and responsibilities to particular “others.” Evidence suggests that most
moral decision-makers draw on both orientations. For a discussion in relation to environmental ethics, see
Warren (2000) and Cuomo (2005).
8
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least slightly less wedded to the Cartesian view of economics or the status quo of
industrial power are willing to acknowledge, first, that we have a big problem with
ethical ramifications on our hands, and second, that, since the problem has economic
aspects, it would be a good idea if economists could contribute something useful to its
amelioration.
Rather than imagine economists as detached and neutral observers of the world, a
better metaphor for our current situation might be medical research. Medical researchers
are, we hope, objective in the sense of not prejudging their findings and not hiding results
that might be inconvenient to their funders. But they are not objective in the sense of
detachment and neutrality. Whereas in a Cartesian model, which does not admit
interests, a neutrality of the researcher towards the object of study is prescribed, in a
cancer research lab 100% of the researchers are anti-cancer. One might hope that 100%
of economists could likewise explicitly identify themselves as pro-survival-of-futuregenerations. In addition, medical researchers are not afraid to be “paternalistic” (or
maternalistic) in their dissemination of the results of their research. They do not assume,
as some economists would have us do in the case of observed savings rates, that observed
behavior is the relevant guide. They would not say that the diet people eat must be the
ideal anti-cancer diet, simply because we observe people eating it. They will advise on
the diet that their research suggests will make people healthier.
A number of mainstream economists including Geoffrey Heal (2000) and Brad
DeLong (2006), as well as Sir Nicholas Stern and his team (2006), have already weighed
in with the judgment that climate change policy is inseparable from consideration of
ethics, and that the well-being of future generations should receive very substantial
weight in any analysis. This points analysis in the right direction. 10
But what about the form and methodology of this mainstream analysis? While
much of the discussion currently takes place in the context of optimal growth models,
there is nothing magically impartial about assuming an infinite sum of aggregate utilities,
being maximized by a hypothetical master planner. 11 In fact, such a formulation is
exactly at odds with our actual situation of living in societies with diverse and
complicated political decision-making processes, many layers of interdependencies,
many sources of well-being and ill-being, wide disparities in distribution, and very little
likelihood of the sorts of compensating transfers hypothesized in cost-benefit models ever
occurring. And if we take a close look, such models are generally not even internally
entirely rigorous, relying on technical assumptions for aggregation and convergence
purposes that would otherwise be considered inadmissible (DeCanio, 2003).

10

Lacking a vocabulary for discussing heartfelt and carefully reasoned value judgments, however, these
discussions of intergenerational considerations can dissolve into “anything goes” terms. For example,
Geoffrey Heal (2007) argues for δ=0, but phrases this view as simply his own “opinion,” reinforcing the
false belief that anything not known with mathematical certainty must therefore be a matter of purely
subjective preference.
11
See also DeCanio (2006).
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It may be that it is rhetorically and political useful, given the current state of
economics and politics, to phrase climate change policy in terms of cost-benefit analysis
and percentages of GDP, as done in the Stern Review. It may be argued that a radically
boiled-down, bumper-sticker-short, punchy “finding” that can serve as a call to action
may be what is most needed right now. Citizens and policymakers tend to associate GDP
levels with well-being levels, and endow analysis phrased in such terms with an (often
misplaced) aura of expertise. But economists—and society—fall into what Alfred North
Whitehead called the “fallacy of misplaced concreteness” (1925) if we start to treat as a
chunk of solid fact such simplified aggregate, summary measures as “the overall costs…of
climate change will be equivalent to losing at least 5% of global GDP each year” and “the
costs of action – reducing greenhouse gas emissions to avoid the worst impacts of climate
change – can be limited to around 1% of global GDP each year” (Stern, 2006, Executive
Summary: 1). Most of the adjustments that will need to be made to mitigate climate
change strongly affect the composition of output and consumption, not merely an overall
magnitude. They will affect how people live and how they perceive their quality of life
in myriad—and perhaps unpredictable—ways.
What sort of economics would it be useful to have? A reluctance to move away
from an mathematical model such as the optimal growth model may be based in a fear of
losing clarity, logical rigor, precision, elegance, parsimony, and generality. It is true that
the model, at least from some angles, scores high on these criteria, and that these are
better goals than, say, sloppiness and vagueness. But if we can leave behind the old
Cartesian model of knowledge, we can acknowledge that an endeavor that values only
these criteria will be impoverished, indeed. Aiming at precision and is a good
counteractive to unnecessary vagueness, for example, but if held up as the only ideal can
lead to conclusions that are wildly inaccurate. And so many simplifying assumptions may
be needed to get to a logically correct answer, that an analysis ends up saying nothing at
all about the real world. A truly powerful and resilient economic analysis can only be
brought about through a balanced valuing of clarity and realism, logical rigor and realworld richness, precision and accuracy, elegance and appropriate complexity, parsimony
and applicability, and generality and usefulness. 12 The lopsided value system that
prioritizes the perceived toughness and “masculinity” of an approach over its actual
overall quality needs to be abandoned.

“High-Reliability” Economics?
To continue the metaphor with health and safety, consider that economics and
other policymakers are currently in a situation with regard to climate change where quick
action is needed, within a highly complex situation, and where lives hang in the balance.
There is an empirical literature on “high reliability organizations” that has looked at
characteristics of successful operations in exactly such situations. These researchers have
examined aircraft carrier flight decks, nuclear power plants, and health care
organizations—all organizations that have to “operate hazardous technologies in a nearly
12

For elaboration, see Nelson (1996).
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error-free manner under trying conditions rife with complexity, interdependence, and
time pressure” (Vogus and Sutcliffe, 2007). Case studies of these micro-level
organizations have identified five behavior processes that are key to establishing highreliability performance. Table 1 lists these five process and their definitions, as they have
become evident in this research.

Characteristic
Preoccupation
with failure
Reluctance to
simplify
interpretations
Sensitivity to
operations
Commitment to
resilience
Deference to
expertise

Table 1: High-Reliability Organizations 13
Elaboration
Operating with a chronic wariness of the possibility of unexpected
events that may jeopardize safety by engaging in proactive and
preemptive analysis and discussion
Taking deliberate steps to question assumptions and received wisdom
to create a more complete and nuanced picture of ongoing operations
Ongoing interaction and information-sharing about the human and
organizational factors that determine the safety of a system as a whole
Developing capabilities to detect, contain, and bounce back from
errors that have already occurred, but before they worsen and cause
more serious harm
During high-tempo times (i.e., when attempting to resolve a problem
or crisis), decision-making authority migrates to the person or people
with the most expertise with the problem at hand, regardless of their
rank

For example, the first characteristic of a high-reliability organization is that it is
constantly on the watch for problems and unexpected events. The mainstream approach
to climate change, on the other hand, assumes that standard approaches, focused on
marginal adjustments and built up during a time in which natural resource limits could be
largely ignored without immediate consequence, should continue to prevail. Standard
optimal growth models tend to assume that the future will be much like the past—for
example, assuming on-going per capita GDP growth of 1% or more per annum. Smooth
substitutability and natural and manufactured capital in production is generally assumed,
as well as the existence of technological fixes for any problem that may arise. The
probability of truly catastrophic events is often assumed to be minimal. 14 Rather than
leading proactive discussions, the mainstream approach encourages complacency.
Characteristics of the mainstream economics approach are summarized in Table 2.
A second characteristic of high-reliability organization is a reluctance to simplify
and a willingness to challenge received wisdom. The mainstream economics approach,
on the other hand, stands for loyalty to a highly stripped-down model of human behavior.
For example, the equating of the preferences behind people’s empirically observed
savings rates with their ethical judgments about future generations, as discussed earlier,
13

Vogus and Sutcliffe (2007).
Weitzman (2007) varies from this approach, arguing that the distribution of the growth rate of the
economy could have a thick left tail. Arrow (2007) also puts greater weight on higher cost scenarios.
14

9

GDAE Working Paper No. 07-03: Economists, Value Judgments, and Climate Change

relies on an exceedingly narrow homo economicus model that characterizes a person as
no more than a set of consumption preferences. More complex judgments that people
may make as citizens or ethical beings are excluded. Much analysis is also simplified by
extreme aggregation. Heroic claims are made about the appropriateness of benefit-cost
analysis based on discounted aggregate utility or, as discussed earlier, the validity of
expressing of policy implications in terms of changes in aggregate GDP.

Characteristic
Preoccupation
with status quo
Dedication to
simplified
interpretations
Sensitivity to
disciplinary
boundaries
Commitment
to rigidity
Deference to
an established
hierarchy

Table 2: Mainstream Economics
Elaboration
Operating with a chronic assumption that the future will be much like
the past.
Relying on highly simplified characterization of human behavior and
highly aggregate analysis.
Staying within rational choice modeling boundaries, neglecting most
information from other disciplines.
Encouraging loyalty to accepted models, no matter how dysfunctional
they become.
Maintaining image of mainstream economists, whose work is peerreviewed by like-minded economists, as sole rational policy advisors.

High reliability organizations are characterized by high levels of interaction and
information-sharing. While mainstream economic analysts of climate change do
selectively borrow information from the physical sciences, they maintain high barriers
against interaction with ecological, political, psychological, philosophical, and
sociological knowledge that might result in challenges of their core assumptions.
Instead of developing capacities to detect and bounce back from errors,
mainstream methodological values tend toward the development of rigidity and blindness
to errors. In fact, if one takes rational agents, consumer sovereignty, and perfect markets
as defining the default case, then errors are ruled--by definition--to be nearly impossible.
In such a framework even harms to life, health, and species survival have to be
considered “chosen.” The persistent failure to recognize ecological limits is another
example of blindness.
Lastly, high reliability organizations yield decision-making power to the person
with most expertise, regardless of rank. In contrast, mainstream economic climate
research is characterized by a closed and self-perpetuating cadre of like-minded
researchers, who seek to dismiss the knowledge and wisdom of others.
The comparison between high-reliability organizations and mainstream
economics climate research is not favorable. This analysis suggests that the economics
profession will need to undergo massive change, in both its explicitly ethical values and

10
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its less explicit methodological values, if it is to help address issues of climate change
before they “worsen and cause more serious harm.”

Conclusion
To provide a useful voice on climate change, economists need to show that they
can think as ethically competent human beings in a social world, and that they can think
outside the box of Cartesian-inspired rational choice theory and modeling. Economists
could potentially have some useful things to say about socially responsible uses of private
property, markets, and global trade; about the design of market institutions, taxes, and
regulation; and about consumption, well-being, employment, and investment. But this
will only happen if we dig into the particulars of the situation and join in dialog with a
proper attitude of modesty, rather than pretend to preach from an imaginary value-free
and perfectly rigorous platform located somewhere outside our ecological world and our
diverse society. The real question we need to address is not “What discount rate should
be applied, within a model of utility maximization?” The first question is, “How do we
want to live, in light of the effects of our life choices on other people and living beings,
now and in the future?”
Fortunately, at least some economists are moving in this direction. As economist
Stephen DeCanio puts it, “Instead of relying on flawed general equilibrium models to
point the way, we should start from a specification of the characteristics of the future (or
potential futures) we wish to bequeath to our successors and work backwards" (2003,
160). Many researchers who consider themselves “ecological” economists work along
such lines. Economists Frank Ackerman, Jim Boyce, Kristen Sheeran, and others have
formed an organization called Economics for Equity and the Environment (or “E3”),
committed to the beliefs that “a clean and safe environment is a birthright of every
person” and that “economists can help craft effective solutions and build a more just and
sustainable future” by “by engaging with real-world problems” (E3 Network, 2006).
Economists just might be able to play an ethically defensible and useful role if we can get
over our romance with detachment, put ourselves firmly on the side of survival, roll up
our sleeves, and get to work.
Julie A. Nelson is a Senior Research Associate at the Global Development and
Environment Institute at Tufts University; inquiries can be directed to
Julie.Nelson@tufts.edu.
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